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ABSTRACT
Recently, deep learning has been successfully applied
to a variety of networking problems. A fundamental
challenge is that when the operational environment for
a learning-augmented system differs from its training
environment, such systems often make badly informed
decisions, leading to bad performance. We argue that
safely deploying learning-driven systems requires being
able to determine, in real-time, whether system behavior
is coherent, for the purpose of defaulting to a reasonable
heuristic when this is not so. We term this the online
safety assurance problem (OSAP). We present three ap-
proaches to quantifying decision uncertainty that differ
in terms of the signal used to infer uncertainty. We
illustrate the usefulness of online safety assurance in the
context of the proposed deep reinforcement learning (RL)
approach to video streaming. While deep RL for video
streaming bests other approaches when the operational
and training environments match, it is dominated by
simple heuristics when the two differ. Our preliminary
findings suggest that transitioning to a default policy
when decision uncertainty is detected is key to enjoy-
ing the performance benefits afforded by leveraging ML
without compromising on safety.
1. INTRODUCTION
A recent trend in networking research is employing ma-
chine learning (ML) and, more specifically, deep learning
(DL), to inform decision making. Example application
domains include video streaming [2, 27, 49], traffic man-
agement [12, 57], resource scheduling [28], packet clas-
sification [26], caching [22], and congestion control [62,
20, 32]. In all these contexts, the ability of deep neural
networks (DNNs) to pick up on complex patterns in data
has proved instrumental.
Unleashing the power of DL on networking domains,
however, requires care. DNNs often require many data
samples to learn, and are so typically trained offline and
then put into practice. When the training environment
is faithful to the operational environment, the DNN will
likely perform well. However, DL is notorious for not
generalizing well when the two environments differ. One
reason for such a mismatch is the standard practice of
training on simulated/emulated environments [27, 20],
which fail to capture the intricacies of real-world net-
works [61]. However, even if training occurs in situ on
real data, as advocated in [61], the operational envi-
ronment encountered after training might still greatly
differ from the training environment due to variability in
network conditions not adequately covered by the finite
training data, or the introduction of new factors such as
routing changes, network failures, the addition/removal
of traffic sources, etc.
Can the benefits of ML-driven networking when train-
ing data is sufficiently rich be reaped without suffering
the performance costs of bad generalization? We pro-
pose a general methodology for the safe deployment of
DL-based systems: building into the system the means
to detect, in real-time, scenarios it was not trained for
and cannot make reliable decisions in. We term this
challenge the online safety assurance problem (OSAP).
Online safety assurance can accommodate the safe de-
ployment of learning-augmented systems by facilitating
switching to a reasonable default algorithm/heuristic
(e.g., a widely deployed system that has already been
“tested in battle” in many operational environments)
when the learning-based system’s decisions no longer
seem sensible. In this sense, online safety assurance is
intended to effectively serve as a “safety net” for DL-
augmented systems.
A key question when tackling OSAP, is how to best
measure decision uncertainty. To ground this question
in a formal framework, we consider the standard model
for sequential decision making, namely, decision making
under a Markov decision process (MDP) [9]. We observe
that there are three natural signals within this model
that could potentially be indicative of uncertainty: un-
certainty regarding the environment state, incoherent
choices of actions, and incoherent perceptions of how
choices of actions impact performance. We present three
notions of uncertainty, corresponding to these different
signals, and present a methodology for how these can be
utilized for online safety assurance. To the best of our
knowledge, ours is the first study to explore uncertainty
signals for safe sequential decision making.
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To illustrate our approach, we ground our investiga-
tion in a concrete application—online bitrate adaptation
(ABR) in video streaming—a concrete DL-based ABR
algorithm—Pensieve [27]—and a concrete default ABR
algorithm—Buffer-Based (BB) [19]. Our preliminary
evaluation results corroborate the findings in [61], show-
ing that while Pensieve dominates BB when its training
data and test data come from the same distribution, it is
typically worse when the two differ, sometimes by a large
margin. This motivates our approach by suggesting that
incorporating into Pensieve the ability to switch to BB
when decision uncertainty is detected can simultaneously
achieve high performance when Pensieve’s training and
operational environments match and safety when the two
differ. Our results for safety-assurance-enhanced vari-
ants of Pensieve provide evidence that this is indeed the
case. Furthermore, our findings reveal that the choice of
uncertainty signal can dramatically affect performance.
We believe that online safety assurance can facilitate
the safe adoption of DL-augmented systems in many
domains, and outline exciting directions for future re-
search.
2. ONLINE SAFETY ASSURANCE
We hypothesize that safe deployment of learning-based
systems can be facilitated by detecting uncertainty in
system decisions and defaulting to a safer policy when a
system is outside its “comfort zone”. The key question,
however, is how to measure uncertainty in sequential
decision making.
To ground this question in a formal framework, we
consider the standard model for sequential decision
making—decision making under a Markov decision pro-
cess (MDP) [9]. We next describe OSAP in the MDP
setting and propose several approaches to online safety
assurance, which differ in terms of the signal used for
detecting uncertainty.
2.1 Sequential Decision Making
We consider an agent that interacts with an environ-
ment. At any discrete time step t = 0, 1, . . . , the agent
takes action at from a set of possible actions A. Following
the agent’s action, the environment, which at time t is at
state st, transitions to a new state st+1 with probability
P (st+1|st, at). Environment states belong to some set of
possible states S. A reward function r maps each state-
action pair (s, a) to an associated reward r(s, a). The
agent’s goal is to select actions that lead to high rewards.
A common objective for the agent is optimizing the γ-
discounted expected return Epi [
∑∞
t=0 γ
tr(st, at)], where
the expectation is taken with respect to the agent’s de-
cision making strategy pi, henceforth termed the policy.
In general, pi is a mapping from the agents observation
history ht = s0, a0, . . . , st to a probability distribution
over actions. In this work, we do not limit ourselves to a
particular objective for the agent, nor to a specific class
of policies pi.
Many algorithms for finding optimal policies for MDPs
employ some form of value function estimation [9, 50].
The value function V pi maps each state s to a pre-
diction of the future benefit to the agent from vis-
iting this state. Formally, when considering the dis-
counted objective, V pi is the expected discounted return
when the agent (whose policy is pi), starts at that state
V pi(s) = Epi [
∑∞
t=0 γ
tr(st, at)| s0 = s].
The above formulation of decision making is very gen-
eral and encompasses essentially all learning-based algo-
rithms proposed for networking problems that we are
aware of (including [27, 12, 28, 26, 2, 20, 61]. In particu-
lar, this formulation encompasses algorithms that reflect
reinforcement learning [50] (RL), adaptive control [5], or
approximate dynamic programming [9] approaches.
2.2 The OSAP Problem
During training, a learning-driven agent observes data
from some distribution µtrain, where by data we mean
the history of observed states, actions, and rewards.
During testing, however, the agent might observe data
from a different distribution µtest. The reason that
the training and test distributions might differ can be a
consequence of various reasons: the system being trained
in simulation/emulation [61], variability in real-world
network conditions not adequately covered by the finite
training data, or the learned decision making policy
driving the agent at test time to environment states that
were not explored during training.
Since the learning-based components of the agent are
trained on specific data, it is only natural that the farther
away the agent is from its training regime, the less
accurate the implicit or explicit information on which
its decisions are based is.1 How can we identify when
the agent’s decisions are not reliable due to a mismatch
between its training and test distributions? In OSAP,
given access to the agent’s training data, the goal is to
devise a rule that, based on the agent’s test observation
history ht, decides whether the agent’s next decision
pi(ht) is reliable or not.
2.3 What to Measure?
To the best of our knowledge, a standard method
for measuring decision uncertainty in sequential deci-
sion making has not yet been established. We take a
step in this direction by proposing and comparing three
approaches to quantifying decision uncertainty, which
differ in the observed signal of uncertainty: uncertainty
regarding the environment’s states, the policy, and the
1We remark that the standard notion of generalization in ML,
and established generalization guarantees, are only applicable
when the training and test distributions are the same. When
outside the training distribution, as explored here, there are
no generalization guarantees [8, 36, 4].
value function. We refer to uncertainty estimation per-
taining to these key MDP terms as US , Upi, and UV ,
respectively.
US . As the agent constantly observes the changes in the
environment’s state, a natural signal for uncertainty is a
dissimilarity between the observed sequences of states
in the training and test data. Deciding whether a test
sample is too different from some training data (a.k.a., is
an outlier, or out-of-distribution) is a standard (unsuper-
vised) ML task termed novelty detection (ND) [44, 52].
US is a natural extension of traditional ND to sequen-
tial decision making, and amounts to deciding whether
the history of observed states in test is an outlier with
respect to its observations on the training distribution.
Uncertainty in US pertains to the agent’s input, that is,
the observed environment state.
Upi and UV . Unlike US , UV and Upi measure uncertainty
with respect to the agent’s output, i.e., its decisions. The
rationale is that, ultimately, it is the output we wish
to be certain of. In principle, even if the training and
test distributions are different, the learned policy might
still provide high performance in test. Thus, measur-
ing uncertainty in the output could potentially prevent
the agent from defaulting when this is not beneficial.
Alternatively, UV and Upi might potentially detect un-
certainty in policy/value even when the training and test
distributions are the same (e.g., due to suboptimality of
the learning algorithm), triggering transition to a safer,
better performing policy.
2.4 How to Measure?
Measuring US as novelty detection. We choose to use a
classic ND method, namely, the one-class support vector
machine (OC-SVM) [44]. OC-SVM enables learning a
function that outputs +1 in a small region capturing
most of the data points, and −1 elsewhere. See formal
exposition in [44].
Methods for measuring uncertainty in the output of
learned functions have been developed for a variety of
specific learning models [46, 39, 6, 15]. We adopt a
general approach that is applicable to arbitrary learning
models, including deep neural networks, and can be ap-
plied to quantify both value and policy uncertainty. Our
method is based on training an ensemble of functions in
the same training environment, and quantifying uncer-
tainty in terms of the extent to which the outputs of the
different functions are in agreement [33, 47].
Measuring Upi via agent ensembles. Consider an ensem-
ble of i different agents trained in the same training
environment, where the only difference in the training
process is the initialization of the neural network vari-
ables. Intuitively, given a state st and an observation
history ht, if each agent is certain in the output of its
individual policy pii, it is expected that the resulting
probability vectors over actions outputted by different
agents be similar. This would indicate that the policy
learned by each agent is not highly dependent on how
the neural network was initialized. To quantify similarity
between probability vectors we use the Kullback–Leibler
(KL) divergence [23], as in many previous studies [45, 47].
Given probability distributions over actions a¯1, . . . , a¯i
outputted by the i agents comprising the agent-ensemble,
the uncertainty according to Upi is the sum of distances
(in terms of KL divergence) of these outputs from the dis-
tribution over actions a¯ obtained by taking the average
over all agent outputs.
Measuring UV via value-function ensembles. Many al-
gorithms for finding optimal policies for MDPs employ
some form of value function estimation [50]. The value
function V pi in such algorithms is often represented as a
neural network and is trained by observing the rewards
derived from selecting actions according to the agent’s
policy pi (on the agent’s training data). Importantly,
even if an agent does not explicitly estimate state values,
a value function for that agent can still be trained ex-
ternally by observing the history of states, actions, and
rewards resulting from the agent-environment interaction
while training.
To measure uncertainty with regards to the value func-
tion, we train i value functions on the training distribu-
tion µtrain. As with agent ensembles, the difference in
training between different value functions is in how the
neural network is initialized. The level of agreement be-
tween the outputs of the different value functions V (pi,i)
is used as an indication of certainty regarding the state
value. Given i state values outputted by the i value
functions comprising the value-function ensemble, the
uncertainty according to UV is the total sum of distances
between these i values and the average value.
2.5 Setting Thresholds for Defaulting
OSAP advises the agent about its uncertainty in its
current decisions. To ultimately decide whether to de-
fault to another policy or not, we must threshold the
uncertainty estimate somehow. To avoid premature tran-
sitions to the default policy because of sporadic or noisy
data points, our thresholding techniques (illustrated in
the ABR context in Section 3), incorporate two ideas
(1) considering sequences of data points; feeding into
the OC-SVM samples in the form of the k last observed
environment states, and examining the variance in Upi
and UV across the last k time steps, for some predeter-
mined k > 0, and (2) only defaulting if uncertainty is
detected l consecutive times, for some predetermined
l > 0. Setting the threshold for defaulting thus involves
configuring k, l, and also, for Upi and UV (which are
continuous measures, unlike the binary US), the bar
above which the action/value is considered uncertain.
Setting the defaulting threshold involves inherent ten-
sion between optimizing performance when the training
and test environments are similar and controlling the
possible damage when this is not so. Even when the
training and test distributions are identical, uncertainty
might still occasionally arise due to differences in the
specific samples drawn from this distribution in train-
ing and test. Hence, if the threshold is set to be “too
low”, the agent will default to another policy often even
when its learned policy is most relevant. In contrast,
if the threshold is “too high”, the agent might stick
with its learned policy even when the circumstances no
longer justify this. How the threshold is set should thus
reflect the system’s designer/operator desired balance
between performance and risk. Determining the default-
ing threshold with respect to a specific learning-based
agent, default policy, environment, and uncertainty esti-
mation metric, is an empirical question. We revisit this
challenge in the concrete example of ABR in Section 3.
A key question when evaluating safety assurance is
how to fairly compare approaches that are based on dif-
ferent signals for uncertainty. We address this through
calibration: in our experiments, online safety assurance
with respect to US , Upi, and UV is calibrated to attain
the same performance when µtraining = µtest, and is eval-
uated based on its performance on the test distribution.
This is inspired by traditional ND literature, in which
a standard evaluation method is to set the threshold to
achieve a prescribed true positive detection rate (say,
95%), and report the true negative detection rate. Our
calibration approach can be regarded as an adaptation
of this common practice to sequential decision making,
in which performance is quantified by achieved rewards.
3. CASE STUDY: VIDEO STREAMING
We consider the case-study of adaptive bitrate (ABR)
selection in video streaming, a subject of extensive recent
attention [63, 27, 61]. In ABR video streaming, videos
are encoded in different resolutions (bitrates) and seg-
mented into chunks of (roughly) equal duration. ABR
algorithms at video clients determine at which bitrate
to download each video segment based on their local ob-
servations about network throughput. Variability in net-
work throughput can be detrimental to QoE, potentially
driving ABR algorithms to undershoot when selecting
resolutions, overshoot and suffer video rebuffering, or
change the bitrate too often.
Recently, applying DL to ABR in various forms has
been proposed (deep reinforcement learning in [27] and
deep network throughput prediction in [61]). In our
ABR case study, we use Pensieve [27] as the learned
policy and Buffer-Based [19] (BB) as the default (“safe”)
policy.
We chose Pensieve for two reasons: (1) While Pensieve
performs well when its training environment reflects the
test environment [27], it suffers from bad performance
when the two differ [61], undermining its practical de-
ployability and motivating the need for online safety
assurance. (2) Pensieve employs an actor-critic [29] rein-
forcement learning algorithm, and so has built-in reward
optimization and value estimation (obviating the need
for quantifying these externally to the protocol). BB is
a simple ABR strategy that performs remarkably well in
practice across a variety of network conditions [61] and
is thus a suitable default policy.
3.1 Evaluation Framework
Datasets. For real-world data, we use two publicly avail-
able datasets: a 3G/HSDPA mobile dataset collected in
Norway [40] (we use the data generated in [27]), and a
4G/LTE mobile dataset collected in Belgium [58]. For
both datasets, 70% of the data was used for training,
while the remaining 30% was used for testing. Valida-
tion was done on 30% of the training set. In addition,
we generated 4 synthetic datasets by sampling network
throughput i.i.d. from different distributions: Gamma
with shape 1 and scale 2, Gamma with shape 2 and scale
2, Logistic with µ = 4 and scale 0.5, and Exponential
with scale 1.
Network emulation. We build upon the experimental
framework in [27], where MahiMahi [30] is used to emu-
late network conditions from input network traces, with
a 80ms RTT between video client and server.
QoE metric. We consider the conventional linear QoE
metric from previous studies [63, 27]:
QoE =
N∑
n=1
Rn − µ
N∑
n=1
Tn −
N−1∑
n=1
|Rn+1 −Rn|,
where N is the number of chunks in the video, Rn is the
bitrate at which video chunk n was downloaded, and Tn
is the rebuffering time that resulted from downloading
chunk n at bitrate Rn. Intuitively, optimizing this QoE
metric corresponds to maximizing the average bitrate
(first term) while minimizing rebuffering time (the second
term) and the jitter between different bitrates (the third
term).
Video. We use the ”EnvivioDash3”video from the DASH–
246 JavaScript reference client [1] (the same video used
in [27]). The video is encoded in six different bitrates
({240, 360, 480, 720, 1080, 1400}p), and is divided into
forty-eight video chunks, each around 4-seconds long.
To prolong the duration of the video we created a new
video by concatenating the original video five times.
Learned and default ABR algorithms. We use Pen-
sieve [27] and Buffer-Based (BB) [19], as implemented
in [27], as the learned and default ABR policies, respec-
tively.
Online safety assurance schemes. We generate three
safety-enhanced variants of Pensieve by incorporating
into Pensieve online safety assurance with respect to
each of our uncertainty metrics, US , Upi, and UV .
US is determined by a OC-SVM (see Section 2.4)
implemented using the SciPy package [59]. During test,
at each time step t, the mean and standard deviation of
the 10 most recent network throughputs are calculated,
and a sample consisting of the k latest [mean, deviation]
pairs is fed into the (trained) OC-SVM model. In our
experiments, k = 5 for the empirical distributions and
k = 30 for the synthetic distributions (we observed that a
longer window was required for good performance on the
synthetic data, which we attribute to the high variance
in these distributions). Given such a sample, the OC-
SVM model provides a binary answer, classifying the
sample as either in-distribution or out-of-distribution
(OOD). When samples are classified as OOD for l = 3
consecutive time steps, the system defaults to BB.
To compute Upi and UV , an ensemble (of agents and
value functions, respectively) of size i = 5 is trained. At
each time step t, the two outputs (actions/values) whose
distance from the average is highest are discarded and Upi
and UV are computed with respect to the three surviving
outputs as explained in Section 2.4. The system defaults
to BB when the variance of this value across the last
k = 5 time steps exceeds a certain threshold α for l
consecutive times. α and l for each of the two schemes
are determined as explained below.
We henceforth refer to the safety enhancements that
use US , Upi, and UV , as novelty detection (ND), agent en-
semble (A-ensemble), and value ensemble (V-ensemble),
respectively.
Threshold calibration. To allow for fair comparison (see
Section 2.5), we calibrate the defaulting thresholds for
the evaluated Upi-based and UV -based safety assurance
schemes to match the performance (QoE) of the US-
based scheme with respect to each considered training
distribution. We defer the thorough investigation of how
different thresholding strategies impact performance to
future research.
Remark: offline and online running times. Our safety
assurance schemes require offline training of novelty de-
tection schemes (for US , OC-SVM in our case) or RL
agents and value functions (for Upi and UV , respectively)
and also online computation to determine whether to
transition to the default policy. Training, in our ex-
periments, was executed (offline) on 24-core Intel(R)
Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @ 2.40GHz w. Nvidia Tesla
M60 GPU machines, and required less than eight seconds
for OC-SVM (for US-based safety assurance), approxi-
mately eight hours for an RL agent (for Upi-based safety
assurance), and approximately four hours for a value
function (for UV -based safety assurance). The online
decision making required far fewer resources, and was
therefore executed on a single core Intel(R) Core(TM)
i5-8500 CPU @ 3.00GHz w. GeForce GT 730 GPU
machine. Each decision required approximately 0.5ms
for US-based safety assurance, 3ms for Upi-based safety
assurance, and 4ms for UV -based safety assurance. Since
ABR decisions typically occur at the granularity of sec-
onds, these running times are orders of magnitude lower
than needed for accommodating timely decisions.
3.2 Pensieve with safety assurance still out-
performs BB in-distribution
We first consider the performance of our safety-
enhancements to Pensieve when in-distribution, i.e.,
when the training and test datasets come from the same
distribution. Figure 1 plots the performance in test of
“vanilla” Pensieve (with no safety assurance), ND, A-
ensemble, V-ensemble, and BB, for all six (training,test)
pairs of datasets that come from the same distribution.
As expected, Pensieve, whose training environment here
faithfully captures its test environment, outperforms BB
in all experiments. Recall that the defaulting thresh-
olds for the agent and value ensembles (denoted by A-
ensemble and V-ensemble, respectively) are calibrated
so as to match the performance of ND (with the fixed
thresholding strategy described in Section 3.1) on the
training distribution. Therefore, when in-distribution,
the three schemes always achieve the same level of per-
formance, as seen in the figure. Observe that this level
of performance is higher than that provided by BB and
lower than that provided by Pensieve. As discussed in
Section 2.5, the latter is a necessary price for accom-
plishing safety when out-of-distribution (OOD). Different
choices of thresholds would strike different trade-offs be-
tween performance in distribution and safety when out
of distribution (see Section 2.5).
Figure 1: Pensieve with and without safety assurance
vs. BB when the training and test distributions are the
same.
3.3 Pensieve is dominated by BB when out-of-
distribution
We next show that when evaluated on a test distri-
bution that does not match its training distribution,
Pensieve can fail catastrophically, in some cases even
performing worse than a naive baseline that always se-
lects the next bitrate uniformly at random, termed “Ran-
dom” henceforth. To illustrate this, Figure 2 contrasts
the performance (QoE) achieved by Pensieve, BB, and
Random for two training distributions: Belgium and
Gamma(2,2). Observe that, with but one exception,
Pensieve is outperformed by BB, and is sometimes even
(significantly) outperformed by Random. This attests
to Pensieve’s inability to generalize well, as also shown
empirically in [61].
(a) Pensieve trained on Belgium and evaluated on the other
datasets.
(b) Pensieve trained on Gamma(2,2) and evaluated on the other
datasets.
Figure 2: Illustration of Pensieve’s (problematic) gener-
alization to other environments
Hereafter, to clearly compare Pensieve’s (with and
without safety assurance) and BB’s performance across
different distributions, and contend with QoE scores be-
ing sometimes positive and sometimes negative, we nor-
malize performance as follows. In all subsequent figures,
a performance value of 0 corresponds to Random’s perfor-
mance (on the relevant dataset), whereas a performance
of 1 corresponds to the gap between BB’s performance
and Random’s performance. Figure 3 depicts Pensieve’s
normalized scores when trained on different distributions
and evaluated on other distributions. When Pensieve’s
score is lower than 1, this indicates that it is outper-
formed by BB, whereas when its score is lower than
0, it is outperformed also by Random. Note that the
scale on the y-axis is linear in the region [-1,1] and log
scale elsewhere. As can be seen in Figure 3, Pensieve is
typically outperformed by BB when OOD.
3.4 Contrasting the three safety assurance
schemes when OOD
Figure 4 depicts the normalized maximal, minimal,
mean, and median performance of the three safety-
enhanced Pensieve variants across all 30 combinations
of training and test datasets that do not come from the
Figure 3: Pensieve’s performance across all datasets.
Figure 4: Comparison of different safety-enhanced vari-
ants of Pensieve OOD.
same distribution. We also present the performance of
Pensieve (without safety assurance). Again, note the log
scale outside [-1,1]. To provide more visibility into our
results, Figure 5 presents a CDF of performance across
our experiments for all 30 training-test dataset pairs.
Evidently, all three safety assurance schemes are better
than vanilla Pensieve in terms of min, mean, and median
values. Figure 4 shows that the choice between the differ-
ent safety assurance schemes allows flexibility in trading
off risk (min performance) for payoff (max/mean/median
performance). How to balance the different factors is
a choice to be made by the system designer. In the
following, however, we seek general claims about the
risk/payoff trade-off for each scheme.
Interestingly, A-ensemble is essentially dominated by
the other two safety assurance approaches, with signifi-
cantly lower min value, worse than Random (!) mean
value, marginally better median value than the other
two, and comparable (to ND) or worse (than V-ensemble)
max performance. We conjecture that this is due to the
fact that when training an ensemble of agents, though
the training domain is the same for all, each might learn
a different (good) policy. Consequently, variability be-
tween agent outputs might manifest even on the training
distribution. Since we calibrate performance on training,
this variability effectively leads to setting the threshold
for defaulting for A-ensemble to be more tolerant to
policy disagreement, and consequently failing to detect
when an agent is operating OOD. This suggests that due
to the high variability in training, A-ensembles are in-
herently less reliable uncertainty estimators for OSAP.
Figure 5: A CDF of performance for the different schemes
across all 30 training-test combinations where test is
OOD
Deciding between ND and V-ensemble depends on
the specific criterion; V-ensemble is better in terms of
max performance, whereas ND is better in terms of
the min and mean performance (the two are compa-
rable in terms of median). Thus, ND constitutes a
safer choice, whereas V-ensemble can potentially pro-
vide higher performance gains. To explain this, first
note that V-ensembles do not suffer from the variabil-
ity of A-ensembles as they are trained with respect to
a single agent’s policy. Second, ND reflects the most
conservative approach, as it defaults whenever OOD
samples are detected, while V-ensemble may potentially
yield higher rewards when choosing to stick with Pen-
sieve on OOD samples when the value has high cer-
tainty.
4. RELATEDWORK
The mismatch between training and test distributions
is the main challenge in off-policy RL [25]. Theoreti-
cal sample complexity guarantees were explored in [56,
55, 14, 54, 16], and recent work explores offline deep
RL [41, 13, 24]. In these works, the mismatch is due
to a change in policy, not in state transitions, as in
our context. Perhaps surprisingly, generalization in RL
has received relatively little attention [53], and recent
studies focus on procedurally generated domains such as
mazes [51, 64, 21] or platform games [31], and learning
robust policies [18, 38]. None of these studies addresses
the question of how to safely react to a change in the
environment.
Classical methods for novelty detection include OC-
SVM [44] and support vector data description [52]. Re-
cent methods build on deep generative models [3, 42,
60, 48, 11]. Curiosity-based exploration in RL involves
guiding the agent to unvisited states during training [35,
43]. Studies of curiosity-based exploration measure un-
certainty in models of the environment [17, 37], in state
observations [7, 10], and in the level of agreement be-
tween an ensemble of value functions or policies [34, 33,
47]. Our uncertainty estimation methods are inspired by
this line of research, but strive to achieve a very different
goal: avoiding uncertainty at test time. Consequently,
our challenges and solutions are different.
5. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
Learning-augmented systems have received much at-
tention of late. However, releasing deep-learning-based
systems in the wild requires guaranteeing that these at-
tain acceptable performance even when their operational
environment deviates from their training environment.
We proposed detecting, in real time, when the decisions
reached by a system are no longer unreliable, and de-
faulting to a safer alternative. Our initial investigation
of such online safety assurance for ABR video stream-
ing revealed that applying novelty detection methods or
value-based uncertainty estimation for this purpose is
promising, whereas using action-based uncertainty as a
signal fares much worse. Natural directions for future
research include the further investigation of which of the
two online assurance schemes, novelty-detection-based
and value-uncertainty-based, is more appropriate in dif-
ferent contexts, and exploring the implications for the
performance of different thresholding strategies. Other
intriguing research directions include extending our pre-
liminary findings for ABR by considering other DL-based
ABR systems (e.g., [61]) and default policies, and investi-
gating online safety assurance when training is performed
in situ [61]. In addition, the exploration of online safety
assurance in other application domains opens exciting
directions for future research.
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